Kosovo and Rwanda: Selective Interventionism?

by Tracy Kuperus

"The [Kosovo] war only underscored the deep ideological divide between an idealistic New World bent on ending inhumanity and an Old World equally fatalistic about unending conflict."

This quote from The New York Times correspondent Michael Wines reflects a growing belief among commentators that the Kosovo conflict has confirmed the movement within the West toward an appreciation of human rights in foreign affairs. NATO's intervention in Kosovo, some argue, was a war of the twenty-first century: it began as an intrastate conflict in which one ethnic group committed gross acts of inhumanity against another, demanding multilateral intervention. Until now, international law has held too rigidly to notions of non-intervention on the basis of territorial integrity. Justice begs for intervention, perhaps even military intervention, in states where ethnic cleansing and other atrocities show that the government has forfeited its legitimacy. But what kind of justice is envisioned and will justice be meted out for all?

Although politicians like Tony Blair see hope in the outcome of Kosovo for a "new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated," there are too many signs that the events and repercussions of the Kosovo conflict have been cut from Old-World cloth. The West's response to humanitarian concerns in Kosovo were reinforced by strategic interests in Europe's future and the NATO alliance. If the West were truly committed to the creation of a world system where respect for humanity was of the highest order, we would take notice of other regions of the world where regimes have engaged in heinous crimes against humanity. Unfortunately, the West has ignored many of these cases.

In Rwanda in 1994, approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in one of the most horrendous examples of genocide since World War II. Two million people fled the country as refugees. The conditions that produced genocide in Rwanda were remarkably similar to those that led to humanitarian violations in Kosovo. A deteriorating political and economic situation led those who sought to maintain their hold on power to brand a group of people as the "scapegoat," which became the target for physical attack and murder. The international community failed to respond. Dominant powers actually resisted effective UN action, and it took over a year for President Clinton to admit that genocide occurred.

What accounts for the difference between Rwanda and Kosovo? The Somali debacle of 1992-93 constrained the West's response to Rwanda's humanitarian disaster, but there is another, more telling, reason: location, location, location. U.S. foreign policy is directed toward those areas where our security is threatened or our national interests are challenged, and Rwanda is considered non-vital to our national interests. However, now may be the opportune time, given the changing international arena and the military hegemony of the U.S., to think seriously about devising new criteria of just and respectful intervention that would apply to more areas of the world than those considered of vital interest to the West.

The United States should begin by offering clear and decisive leadership on the question of a new internationalism. Post-Cold War foreign policy making has, to this point, been ambiguous, but the new millennium promises more cases like Kosovo. There is a serious need to develop principles that determine just intervention that will not be abused by the powerful for arbitrary reasons. Consistent and strategic thinking related to sovereign equality, self-determination, just war, and appropriate humanitarian intervention would lead to a foreign policy agenda that prevents conflicts from escalating out of control. Rather than intervening in situations when the only options appear to be secession or continued sovereignty, we may be able to encourage nations to consider solutions like power-sharing before conflict breaks out.

An American commitment to a new internationalism, if indeed it comes to pass, will not guarantee more attention to cases like Rwanda, which will be regarded as non-vital to U.S. national interests. But worthwhile alternatives exist, including increased support from the West for regional security organizations and appropriate UN intervention in areas where massive human rights abuses are occurring. This commitment on the part of the U.S. seems far less certain in an age of American self-reliance and growing isolationist rhetoric; nevertheless, such alternatives could hasten to ease the divide between the Old and New World.