A Force for Freedom?

First Quarter 2004

What Kind of Force? What Kind of Freedom?

by James W. Skillen

We are taking sure, steady steps to a place where the state of Israel will no longer be a democracy and a home for the Jewish people," said Ami Ayalon, former head of Israel's Shin Bet security service, in an interview published November 13 (Washington Post, 11/14/03).

Most Arab states in the Middle East are not yet ready for full-blown democracy, according to Hala Mustafa and David Makovsky (Washington Post, 11/18/03). They need a push from the outside toward "gradual yet persistent liberalization" that will help "lay the building blocks for democracy."

President Bush, lauding the National Endowment for Democracy on November 6, told the audience that movement in the right direction is assured, historically and divinely: "Over time, free nations grow stronger and dictatorships grow weaker.... Liberty is both the plan of Heaven for humanity, and the best hope for progress here on Earth."

If democracy and liberty are "the plan of heaven for humanity," is it a mistake to think that Israel could ever slide back from democracy to something worse, as Ami Ayalon and three other former Israeli security chiefs now fear? Is it a mistake to think that Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria might never become free? Or is the mistake, instead, to believe in the inevitable progress of freedom?

Force and Freedom in the Middle East

These are among the most important questions at the heart of the multidimensional drama unfolding in the wider Middle East right now, where American involvement is so heavy and perplexing. The U.S. used military force in Iraq to oust a dictator whom we once encouraged when he was fighting Iran. In that earlier time, the U.S. viewed Iran as the greater threat to American interests and to the future of liberty and democracy. Today, American troops are still in Iraq to bring liberty and democracy where democracy has not existed. Perhaps the U.S. is laying "the building blocks of democracy" in accord with the plan of heaven that Iraqis cannot yet grasp on their own.

However, President Bush has in recent weeks agreed to a plan of turning sovereignty over to the Iraqis before democratic elections are held. The majority Shiite Muslim leaders are unsympathetic if not downright opposed to such an approach. Yet because of continuing (if not growing) opposition to the U.S. military occupation, the Bush administration is looking for a more rapid change by summer. This would seem to suggest that the administration recognizes how counterproductive to freedom its military occupation of Iraq has become. Yet by trying to solve this problem of counterproductive force, the U.S. may be willing to leave Iraq before democracy has been secured. Is that good for freedom?

Israel is the most advanced democracy in the Middle East, but it was brought into existence by a multinational mandate following World War II and imposed on the region without a democratic vote and without the exercise of free consent by those who lived there. And in order to maintain its existence, Israel has had to exercise military vigilance for more than 50 years. Today it is in constant combat with Palestinian resistance organizations and suicide bombers. Moreover, democratic Israel has been establishing settlements on territory that does not (by the 1948 design) belong to it, and the Israeli government is doing this by expropriating land from Palestinians without their say in the matter—without their free participation. Israel's actions, furthermore, are backed, even if sometimes mildly criticized, by the United States, which sends it billions of dollars of aid every year. So the U.S. is implicated daily in helping to preserve the state of Israel, though it has not yet begun to force democracy on the Palestinians.

These developments have now driven four former Israeli security chiefs to warn of Israel's degradation and decline, due to increased militarization, a miliatarization that has also aroused growing opposition to Israel's policies from many Jews in Israel and outside. [See "Is Peace Possible in the Middle East?" by Marc Ellis, also in this issue.] The crisis in Israel has also inspired two different peace initiatives from Israelis and Palestinians outside government. One is a two-state solution proposed by one of the four former Israeli security chiefs, Ami Ayalon (whom we quoted at the beginning of this article), and Sari Nusseibeh, head of a Palestinian university. More than 100,000 Israelis have signed the document, as have more than 65,000 Palestinians. The second initiative is called the Geneva Accord, drafted by Yossi Beilin, a former Israeli minister of justice, and Yasir Abed Rabbo, former Palestinian information minister. This proposal has met with even greater support among Israelis and Palestinians.

There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator, measured not just by democratic standards but by human dignity standards. His capture on December 13 must be celebrated as good news. There can be no doubt that Palestinian suicide bombers and opposition groups willing to use violent tactics to fight Israel are part of the reason for instability and lack of freedom in the Palestinian territory and the immediate reason for Israeli retaliation. Yet if freedom and democracy are the goal, how does one make the case that the outside military destruction of Hussein's government and Israel's militarized advancement of settlements in Palestinian territory are the path to that goal? Does the justification come from the fact that the U.S. and Israel are democracies while Iraq and the Palestinian territory are not?

Democracy and National Interests

One of the longest standing testimonies of history is that powerful states typically defend and advance their own interests whether or not those actions enhance the freedom and well-being of other peoples. What then does President Bush's constantly repeated language about the progress of freedom in the world mean? Does the president intend, seriously, to say that the U.S. will not halt or retreat from its foreign interventions until freedom has come to the whole world? Or is the rhetoric of freedom used more as a domestically popular cover for the protection and advancement of American national interests even when U.S. actions do not promote the realization of freedom and democracy in the world?

Consider the fact that there already is a model democracy in the Middle East, from President Bush's point of view. It is the state of Israel. If Israel is not sufficient as a representative of liberty's inevitable future in the region, and if that is why Iraq must be made a democracy, then will a democratic Iraq plus a democratic Israel be sufficient? Or must the U.S. continue to try to implement the plan of heaven by forcing other undemocratic countries in the region to become free? On November 6, the president gave assurances that freedom has been growing of its own accord in the Middle East: "In Bahrain last year, citizens elected their own parliament.... Oman has extended the vote to all adult citizens; Qatar has a new constitution; Yemen has a multiparty political system; Kuwait has a directly elected national assembly; and Jordan held historic elections this summer." Yet if all these countries have been moving forward to democracy, why did the U.S. need to force an abrupt end to Iraq's dictatorship? When can the U.S. allow democracy and freedom to arise on their own, in the inevitable course of historical progress? And how does it discern when history is moving too slowly, so that the U.S. must intrude from the outside to speed it up?

When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban government, the reason was the Taliban's backing of Al Qaeda terrorists who destroyed so many lives and so much property in the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Prior to 9/11, the U.S. had no plans to liberate Afghanistan. Our military action was thus a matter of just defense, not the launch of a crusade for democracy. Nonetheless, President Bush now refers to Afghanistan as an example of the march of freedom. In early December he said, "500 delegates will convene a national assembly in Kabul to approve a new Afghan constitution. The proposed draft would establish a bicameral parliament, set national elections next year, and recognize Afghanistan's Muslim identity, while protecting the rights of all citizens."

If, however, we look beneath the surface of these developments in Afghanistan, as Paul Marshall, of Freedom House, did ("Taliban Lite," 11/7/03), what we find is not altogether encouraging. The proposed Afghan constitution, currently being debated and revised for adoption by a weeks-long loya jirga (constitutional assembly), is, according to Marshall, "a murky blueprint for a repressive state." "The draft provides no guarantees of religious freedom." It "outlaws any political party 'contrary to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam.'" Although the draft outlaws discrimination on the basis of religion and sex and "professes adherence to international human rights standards, these provisions are subject to the stipulation that they cannot be contrary to an undefined 'sacred religion of Islam.'"

If the United States accepts a new Afghani constitution of this kind, does that mean it is showing respect for Afghanistan's freedom to choose the kind of political order it wants even if that order is not one of equal freedom for all? Or does it mean the U.S. doesn't care whether freedom comes soon or at all to Afghanistan? Or does it mean that as long as the government in Afghanistan poses no threat to American interests, it is not our business to decide what kind of constitution it has?

Let's step outside of the Middle East and southern Asia for a moment and consider U.S. relations with Russia. Here, too, President Bush hails the end of the evil empire and the progress of freedom and democracy. His friend Vladimir Putin is now an important ally in the war against terrorism, even to the point where the U.S. no longer voices public objection to Russia's devastating treatment of the Chechens. Yet, as increasing evidence shows, President Vladimir Putin has in recent months been undermining press freedom, open and fair elections, and the rule of law in Russia, none of which was contradicted by his party's overwhelming victory in parliamentary elections in early December. According to Stephen Sestanovich (Washington Post, 11/20/03), "Bush administration officials have convinced themselves that these events are part of along, slow transition from communism, whose meaning won't be clear for years—so don't bother about them." Administration and State Department officials don't want to jeopardize "Putin's support on front-burner national security problems," according to Sestanovich. The Bush administration's chief concern in this relationship is clearly America's own interests and security, not the antidemocratic developments in Russia.

So, which is it? Does the United States act, as states have always acted, to protect and advance its own interests, cooperating with dictators, authoritarian governments, and democratic governments as need arises? Or does President Bush's rhetoric of freedom represent a genuinely new direction in American foreign policy such that the U.S. will henceforth stand up for freedom and try to compel the advancement of democracy in Russia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and everywhere else on earth, regardless of the costs and dangers?

American Rhetoric and Practice

To ask these questions is almost certainly to answer them. For there is little evidence that American foreign policy can escape the bind in which states have always found themselves. The U.S. is not and cannot be an impartial, disinterested servant of freedom in the world. It is simply not accurate to say, as the president said on November 6, that "the advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country," as if freedom were the dominant and guiding aim of American foreign policy. That language is used to inspire the moral support of the American people for actions the administration takes. For the sake of advancing American interests and advantage, however, we may well give in to a repressive constitution in Afghanistan; we may well put up with Putin's undermining of essential civil rights in Russia; we may well continue to allow Israel to decide the terms of any future arrangement with the Palestinians; we may well allow an undemocratic interim Iraqi government to establish a process that leads not to a democratically free state but to something quite different indeed—perhaps an Islamic state as is likely to emerge in Afghanistan.

Why will we do this? For two reasons. First, because the U.S. does not rule the world and cannot pretend to be the vanguard of freedom and democracy wherever and whenever it chooses. Second, because every state looks after what it perceives to be its own interests first and pushes its agenda in the world to the extent that it can, in keeping with the limits of its own power and interests. These two reasons help to explain why people and political leaders throughout the world have been responding so negatively to President Bush's rhetoric of freedom-idealism coupled with American actions in Iraq. The rhetoric cloaks more complex, self-interested aims and puts the U.S. in the position of self-righteous hypocrite.

This brings us back to the question of the relation between force and freedom, between the protection of national interests and the advancement of democracy. President Bush has expressed very little criticism of Israel's policies toward the Palestinians. His first principle is Israel's right to defend itself against terrorists. In his foreign policy speech on November 19 during the state visit to Great Britain, the president said, "The people have given us the duty to defend them. And that duty sometimes requires the violent restraint of violent men. In some cases, the measured use of force is all that protects us from a chaotic world ruled by force." This is where President Bush comes closest to the first reason he gave a year ago for leading America to war against Saddam Hussein. The reason was the defense of American citizens from an imminent attack, that is, to defend the citizens who elected him. This is the chief justification that has long been recognized in international law for any state's use of force: to defend itself from attack. No government needs additional international approval to defend itself. The president convinced Congress of the imminent danger, though he did not convince the U.N. Security Council, to which he did not even need to appeal if the reason for the preemptive attack was our own defense.

Yet if it is the duty of the U.S. to violently restrain violent men in order to protect us "from a chaotic world ruled by force," then why has the Bush administration stopped at deposing the violent man Saddam Hussein? Why not depose the violent man Kim Jong Ii in North Korea? Why not take down some of the violent dictators in Africa? Why not the unjust, undemocratic regime in Iran?

What the Bush rhetoric does not adequately disclose is that "liberty" and "democracy" do not simply spring up from the ashes of defeated dictators and communist regimes. Democracy represents self-government and depends on a culture of trust in institutions such as legislatures, elections, courts, and a free press. The Muslims in Iraq do not have a western cultural heritage. They have a culture of trust in Islamic institutions, relying heavily on the authority of imams and ayatollahs. Those institutions are not unrepresentative, and the people of that culture support them. If that which President Bush wants to impose in Iraq is a western-style democracy, he will have to change the culture of Iraq's majority. Yet this is precisely what a military cannot do. Military force is a tool or extension of government. That is why in the United States we insist that the military be entirely under civilian control. The military has not produced our culture or our democratic institutions.

By the same token, the American military cannot by itself advance freedom or American interests in the world. The militarization of a country's foreign policy can, in fact, do a great deal to harm to it. This is precisely what Israeli critics of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's foreign policy and American critics of U.S. foreign policy are now arguing. Israel and the U.S. have every right to defend themselves. But making military action the main ingredient, the lead ingredient, the dominant ingredient of foreign policy is a mistake. The use of force can defend against attack but it cannot produce peace, democracy, and freedom. If Israel wants to live in peace with its neighbors, it will have to do more than fight and build defensive walls and fences. If the U.S. wants to promote freedom and democracy in the world, it will have to do the hard, internationally cooperative, political and economic work of promoting the very thing President Bush called for in London: "limited government, equal justice under law, religious and economic liberty, political participation, free press, and respect for the rights of women."