The Russian Idea

Third Quarter 2003

Americans tend to think of the United States as the vanguard of history, God's chosen nation, to bring freedom to the world, leading all other nations even today in the fight against evil. But Russia has an even older sense of divine destiny, from its Orthodox past, when Moscow was judged to be the third Rome, the new center of Christianity and hope for the world. For comparative purposes, then, it is good at this time to be able to read a long essay (digested below) on the "Russian Idea" by the Hellemans, who spent many years teaching at Moscow State University, after serving as missionaries in the Philippines and before moving to their current post in Africa. The Hellemans represent both Canadian and Dutch cultures and know the United States from the inside. The following summary cannot do justice to the longer essay, so we invite you to request a copy of the latter by sending $5.00 to cover postage and handling costs.

Aileen Kelly, reviewing the fifth of five volumes on the life of Fyodor Dostoyevsky by Joseph Frank, explains that Dostoyevsky never fully reconciled his faith in the Kingdom of Heaven with a hoped-for messianic kingdom brought to earth by the Russian Idea. When, in 1876, Russia went to war with Turkey, Dostoyevsky saw it as the "denouement of the drama of world history." He predicted the conquest of Constantinople (the original seat of Eastern Orthodoxy) and the unification of the Slays under Russia's political domination, to be followed by an apocalyptic confrontation in which the dying civilization of Europe would be saved and all nations united in brotherhood by means of the "Russian idea," contained in Russia's Orthodox religion, which alone was faithful to the essence of Christianity (New York Review of Books, March 27, 2003).

Today, throughout Russia, there is revived discussion of the Russian Idea as people seek answers to their questions about Russia's past and future. This article opens a window on the Russian scene.—Ed.

There is richness as well as confusion in the words, "Russian Idea." In contemporary literature this idea functions primarily as an expression of a common Russian identity, especially in a time of crisis and transition when that identity is threatened. But it also represents shared values: ethnic, historical, social, cultural, and religious. It points to character traits of the Russian nation that are unique, distinguishing Russia from other nations. As such it represents a national principle, nationalistic aspirations, and beyond that an ideology, whether as a political program or, less immediately, as a distillation of semi-mythical dreams and hopes for the future, portraying Russian's own destiny and special role in history.

The fact that the Russian Idea comes up for discussion especially in times of crisis and is often associated with messianic illusions suggests that political aspects of the idea predominate. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, much energy has been expended on politico-geographical problems of revised borders and the rearrangement of people groups. Especially noteworthy is the problem of large numbers of ethnic Russians stranded in regions outside Russia, from Latvia to the new central Asian republics.

The transition from a supra-nationalist, multi-ethnic Soviet federation to a renewed Russian national identity has certainly not been easy or automatic. The transition was caused by the demise of a single-party system and by crucial changes in the entire economic system and in the role allotted to religion after decades of militant atheism. Questions about the kind of nation Russians now want to be, and the kind of state they want to have, will not be answered adequately until they face up to the legacy from both the communist and the tsarist periods of their history.

What is the Russian Idea?

In a 1996 article on the Russian Idea, James Scanlan called it a "spectre" of reaction because of its frequent association with chauvinistic anti-Western isolationism and nationalism. Tim McDaniel's The Agony of the Russian Idea (also in 1996)—the most extensive western publication on the Russian Idea by a non-Russian—also argues that the idea represents a reactionary and romantic rejection of modernization and democratic reforms, thus showing itself to be out of touch with the needs of Russia as a modern secular nation.

In our view, however, it is not the political, but the cultural, philosophical, ideological, and religious aspects of the Russian Idea that should draw our closest attention. There is an important link between renewed discussion of the Russian Idea today and the revival of religious philosophy as part of the quest for a new sense of identity. For example, Russians typically pride themselves on their "spirituality," their dukhovnost. This cannot be understood without due recognition of the long chapter of Russian history characterized by Orthodoxy (stamped and led by the Orthodox Church).

Discussion of the Russian Idea started more than a century ago with Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821-1881) in the context of Russia's war with Turkey. His vision of Russia was thoroughly messianic. He called Russians a "God-bearing" people and wrote that "to become a genuine Russian means to seek finally to reconcile all European controversies, to show the solution of European anguish in our all-humanitarian and all-unifying Russian soul, to embrace in it with brotherly love all our brethren, and finally, perhaps, to utter the ultimate word of great universal harmony, of the brotherly accord of all nations abiding by the law of Christ's gospel."

Arguments over the meaning of the Russian Idea reached a critical stage early in the 20th century when Pan-Slavists, Marxists, and others were contending for the future of Russia. Although 20th-century Marxist-Leninist Bolsheviks rejected the Russian Idea, the only parts of the idea that were incompatible with Soviet ideology, according to Scanlan, were its Orthodox spirituality and Russian ethnicity. In fact, Scanlan claims that the intellectual legacy of the Russian Idea was responsible for the messianic mentality, communitarian brotherhood, and anti-western attitudes of the Bolsheviks.

An important work by Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948)—The Russian Idea (1948)—identified the religious character and vocation of the Russian people as the central, common element for the Russian Idea. Berdyaev interpreted the idea from a transcendent, eschatological perspective, namely as God's view of Russia. Moderation, he affirmed, is not part of the Russian character, for it reflects the contradictions and polarizations of the struggle between East and West for supremacy in its vast land. His eschatological approach led him to seek resolution of these tensions in the new Jerusalem where love, community, and freedom would finally be harmonized. Berdyaev knew that Russians need ultimate values by which to orient themselves toward that destiny.

Contemporary discussion of the Russian Idea came to a head in the early 1990s among national patriotic groups struggling to define a political agenda, while reacting strongly to painful economic reforms and the collapse of communism. The contemporary political spectrum reveals that while some Russians are committed to liberal democratic reforms and some to statism, most adhere to some form of authoritarianism whether from the left or the right. Supporters of the communist-Orthodox alliance, which has emerged among the latter, greatly outnumber liberal democrats. The strength of the alliance lies primarily in its appeal to the messianic sense of Russia's destiny, reaching back to the role of Orthodoxy in the earliest history of Moscow.

In what sense, then, is the Russian Idea an ideology? The word "ideology" has been used both positively and negatively to identify a worldview based on a system of beliefs that guides political and social programs. Especially since the Fascist and Nazi period in Western Europe, the word has taken on primarily negative connotations in the West. But in Russia, even today, "ideology" is free of such negative associations. After the communist ideology was undermined and the Soviet regime fell, Russians felt the loss of ideological underpinnings for political action. A return to the discussion of the Russian Idea has come about in part to fill that vacuum.

Contemporary Developments

In 1996, after narrowly defeating Zyuganov, whose Communist Party actively promoted the Russian idea, Boris Yeltsin established a commission to search for a more acceptable definition of this idea. Although the commission reached no consensus, Yeltsin's government incorporated many aspects of the agenda of the Orthodox-nationalist patriots in its attempt to legitimize its own definition of the Russian Idea. Yeltsin's successor as president, Vladimir Putin, has called for the development of a "new Russian Idea," which he says should contain both "universal humanitarian" and "traditional Russian" values. Putin's words complement pronouncements by Patriarch Aleksey II on the role the Orthodox Church should play as the guarantor of the spiritual unity of the nation. Only narrowly avoiding endorsement of state religion, the patriarch has portrayed the Orthodox Church as the true embodiment of the Russian nation and guardian of its collective soul.

As nationalized religion, Orthodoxy is clearly a force to be reckoned with in Russia today and lies close to the heart of the Russian Idea. Moreover, the 1997 law on traditional religious groups and freedom of conscience has given primacy to Russian Orthodoxy over other recognized groups (Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Protestantism, and Catholicism). In the history of Christianity, Orthodoxy has been tied to national identities more closely than has Protestantism or even Catholicism.

The strength of national identity that comes from combining religion and nationalism also hides critical weaknesses, however. Nationalized religion is especially problematic when political power dictates its priorities or interferes with the Church's appointment of its own leaders. Moreover, what unites the nationalist core of a people may also serve to alienate those citizens who do not share that identity. Can the Russian Federation afford to alienate Islamic and other religious and ethnic groups, for example?

So we come back to an important question for the current discussion of the Russian Idea. Can Orthodoxy fill the ideological void left by the collapse of tsarism and communism? Should it try to do so? Those who reject the Russian Idea because it is inherently conservative and reactionary are not altogether wrong. However, to write it off as wholly reactionary is to neglect history and misunderstand contemporary dynamics in politics and religion. Russia today provides eloquent testimony to the importance of religion in public life. Those who overlook or dismiss that fact are blind to reality. It is our prayer that the deep roots of the Christian faith in Russia will remain for them a living well from which to draw as they sort out the ideological elements in their struggle for identity, and as they work toward a just pluralism for the varied people groups in Russia's vast territories.