The Myth of Religious Neutrality

May-June 1992

By Roy A. Clouser

WASHINGTON, D.C.—[Late last year, the University of Notre Dame Press released a new book by Prof. Roy A. Clouser titled The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of Religious Belief in Theories ($18.95 paper; $39.95 cloth). Dr. Clouser, who teaches philosophy at Trenton State College (New Jersey), is a board member of the Center for Public Justice and a contributor to this Report.

[The book, which has been nominated for the American Academy of Religion's "Excellence Award in Religious Studies," begins with a consideration of the nature of both religion and theory making. The author then illustrates his main argument in three chapters dealing with mathematics, physics, and psychology. The book concludes with four chapters on the development of radically biblical theories, the last of which outlines a biblical theory of the state.

[Written for students not yet initiated into academic philosophy, Clouser's book can be read by anyone seriously interested in pursuing questions about faith and reason. It lays an important foundation for the work of the Center for Public Justice. The following excerpts come from the book's Introduction and Afterword.—Ed.]

Religious Belief: The Most Powerful Force in the World

To what extent does religious belief make a difference to the ways people understand and conduct their lives?

The popular answer is that it all depends on how religious a person is. It makes virtually no difference at all for an atheist, while a fanatic thinks and cares about little else. For the majority between these two extremes, religion deals mostly with a person's eternal destiny rather than with this present life, outside of providing moral guidance and comfort in the face of death. But most of the affairs of day-to-day life are indifferent to religious belief.

As a result of investigating religious belief and its influences for over thirty years, I have become convinced that these popular opinions are completely mistaken. Instead, I find that religious belief is the most influential of all beliefs, and the most powerful force in the world.

Religious belief has the most decisive influence on everyone's understanding of the major issues of life across the entire spectrum of human experience. Moreover, it exercises this influence upon all people independently of their conscious acceptance or rejection of the religious traditions with which they are acquainted.

The enormous influence of religious beliefs remains, however, largely hidden from casual view; its relation to the rest of life is like that of the great geological plates of earth's surface to the continents and oceans. The movement of these plates is not apparent to a casual inspection of any particular landscape and can only be detected with great difficulty.

Nevertheless, so vast are these plates, so stupendous their power, that their visible effects —mountain ranges, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions—are but tiny surface blemishes compared with the force of the mighty plates themselves. Similarly, the great historic traditions of religious teaching, and the institutions devoted to their preservation, are merely the surface effects of religious belief which is a vaster and more pervasive force than all of them put together....

In speaking of religious belief as the most pervasive of all beliefs I do not mean to suggest that we speak our native tongue or add a column of figures differently depending on our religion. Speaking and counting usually take place at a level of experience where our activities and our acquaintance with the world around us are remarkably the same for all people. But there is a deeper level of understanding which humans have always sought, the level at which the nature of our world and ourselves is interpreted and explained. In our culture, that level has long been thought to be attained through theories. It is by the theories of philosophy and the sciences that we try to explain all that we experience.

The central claim of this book is that all such theories cannot fail to be regulated by a religious belief of some kind.

To many readers this claim will be not merely surprising but outrageous. Scientific theories, especially, are supposed to be the most neutral and unbiased explanations of all. Such a claim may therefore tempt some readers to think that I cannot possibly mean it literally. So let me assure you that I am not overstating it now, only to water it down later. I will not, for example, argue that all theories have unprovable assumptions, call these assumptions "faith," and then conclude that religious faith in that way influences theories. That would be a huge waste of time. Everyone in philosophy and the sciences knows that theories have unprovable assumptions. But a belief is not religious just because it is unprovable.

Nor will I argue that theory making is influenced by the moral beliefs of the theorist, and then try to connect (or equate) religion with morality. There are notable instances of moral influences on theorizing, and some are cases in which the morality was directly derived from a religious tradition. But that is not at all the sort of thing intended by this claim. Nor will I be defending the oft-suggested view that philosophy and science are limited in what they can explain, so that religious beliefs fill in the gaps left over by theories. I am not claiming merely that theories in this way "leave room" for faith.

Religious Belief Controls Theory Making

Rather, I will contend that one religious belief or another controls theory making in such a way that the contents of the theories differ depending on the contents of the religious belief they presuppose. In fact, so extensive is this religious influence that virtually all the major disagreements between competing theories in the sciences and in philosophy can ultimately be traced back to differences in their religious presuppositions.

This means that theories about math and physics, sociology and economics, art and ethics, politics and law can never be religiously neutral. They are all regulated by some religious belief. The effects of religious beliefs therefore extend far beyond providing the hope for life after death or influencing moral values and judgments. By controlling theory making, they produce important differences in the interpretation of issues that range over the whole of life....

The discovery of this relation between religious belief and theory making is not merely a matter of intellectual curiosity, but is of enormous importance. If theories differ according to the religious beliefs controlling them, then those of us who believe in God should have distinctive theories from those who do not share our biblical Faith. It is for this reason the book concludes with blueprints for constructing or reinterpreting theories so as to bring them under the control of belief in God. These include guidelines for a theory of reality, a theory of society, and a political theory, all of which consciously attempt to make the Judeo-Christian idea of God their controlling presupposition.

I want to make it clear, therefore, that the primary intent of this book is not to convert unbelievers or to refute atheism, agnosticism, or secular humanism. Insofar as such "isms" are mentioned at all, the references to them are always secondary to my main purpose. This book is addressed to those who believe in God. I write here as a Christian seeking to persuade my brothers and sisters in the religious family of those who serve the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob that their faith mandates a distinct perspective for the interpretation of every aspect of life. And this distinct perspective extends to the construction and/or reinterpretation of philosophical and scientific theories, so that there is no area or issue of life which is neutral with respect to our faith....

Opening Doors to Communication, Not to Confrontation

[You might object, however,] that this position, if accepted, will only serve to further divide people and set them at odds with one another. For it means that theories are the products of spiritual faith communities working out explanations which differ relative to their religious beliefs. Moreover, the position goes beyond simply uncovering that religious control has in fact occurred. It argues that such control is unavoidable because the role of religious belief is embedded in the very nature of theoretical reasoning. In addition, it acknowledges that because theoretical reasoning is always faith-directed there can be no religiously neutral faculty or procedure by which religious beliefs themselves can be adjudicated. So won't this position result in isolating the "isms" of philosophy and science and encouraging intolerance among them? Won't assigning theories to various faith communities serve to galvanize their advocates into the kind of opposition to one another that will produce a total breakdown in communication? Won't there be rock throwing in place of dialogue?

The answer to such questions is that nothing could be further from the truth. First of all, pointing out the root causes of theory differences does not itself produce intolerance or lack of communication on the part of those who differ, any more than it produces the differences themselves. Intolerance and unwillingness to communicate with those who disagree are the fruits of the sin that infects human nature, not of uncovering the ultimate cause of disagreements. As such, intolerance and its consequences are evils that can and do plague disagreements in philosophy and science as well as in practical life.

The second part of our reply is even more important. It is that uncovering the religious roots of theoretical perspectives actually opens the way to more fruitful communication than is otherwise possible. My reasons for saying this are, first, that if religious control is a fact, then attempts to communicate without an awareness of it will be frustrated by its hidden effects. And second, where the parties to a debate view reason itself as autonomous and neutral, it is hard for each not to see the extent to which the other differs as the extent to which the other is not being rational. The danger, then, is that the other's position will not only be rejected as false, but condemned as irrational. And insofar as rationality is taken as an essential characteristic of being human, it will then be hard to refrain from seeing not only the other position but the other person as substandard or even subhuman.

On the other hand, recognizing that all people have religious beliefs which regulate their theorizing can allow thinkers a mutual respect of one another's large-scale theory differences as expressions of their alternative faiths. They may then be able to appreciate why others, starting from their contrary religious beliefs, developed their opposing theories in just the way they did. On this basis they can then explore any points of contact and agreement they may have, as well as gain greater insight into the nature of their genuinely irreconcilable differences. And this may all be done without the temptation of either side to view the other as sub-rational.